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This paper investigates the transmission mechanism of dual monetary system from conventional
and Islamic policy rates to inflation and output. We apply Granger Causality and VAR methods on monthly
data of Indonesian banking, during the period of January 2003 to December 2009. The result shows that
conventional policy rate is transmitted to output and inflation, while Islamic policy rate are not. In addition,
the shock of conventional interest rate, credit and interbank rate give a negative and permanent impacts
on inflation and output, except for SBI (Certificate of Bank Indonesia) with positive impact to inflation
though negatively affect the output. On the other hand, the shock of PLS, financing and Islamic interbank
PLS, as well as SBIS (Central Bank Shariah Certificate) give positive and permanent impacts on inflation
and output.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The central bank monetary policies intend to affect the real economic activities and the
prices through transmission mechanisms. This requires sufficient understanding of the
transmission mechanisms within the economy. Monetary policies can be transmitted through
various channels, such as interest rates, monetary aggregates, credit, exchange rates, asset
prices, and expectations (Warjiyo and Agung, 2002). Thus, a clear understanding of the
transmission is the key for monetary policies to influence the direction of the real economy and
prices in the future.
Since New Banking Act in 1998, Indonesia has implemented a dual banking system,
where conventional and Islamic banks can operate side by side throughout Indonesia. With the
implementation of Bank of Indonesia»s Act in 1999, Bank of Indonesia has a dual mandate to
conduct both conventional and Islamic monetary policies. Since then, the Islamic banking and
finance has been growing rapidly.
In 2000, there were two Islamic banks and three Islamic business units (Unit Usaha Syariah)
with 65 offices, controlling only 0.17% of total banking assets. At the end of 2010, 11 Islamic
banks and 23 Islamic business units have been established with a total of 1,477 offices and
1,277 channeling office. The market share for Islamic banks reached 3.24% of the total assets,
or equivalent of Rp 97.52 Trillion with 48% growth per year.
Figure 1.
The Growth of Islamic Bank in Indonesia
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The growth of Islamic banks can be observed from the expansion of the deposit and
financing. In 2000, the deposits reached a total of Rp 1.03 Trillion, and financing reached
Rp 1.27 Trillion with an FDR (Financing to Deposit Ratio) of 123%. By the end of 2010,
total deposits grew by 45.47% annually, reaching Rp 76.04 Trillion, while financing grew
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by 45.42% annually, reaching Rp 68.18 Trillion, with 89.67% FDR. This FDR level was an
enormous achievement compared to Islamic banks in other countries, and also far beyond
the LDR (Loan to Deposit Ratio) of conventional banks in Indonesia, which only reached
75.21%.
In terms of monetary policies, Bank of Indonesia introduced the first Islamic monetary
instrument in 2000, the Wadi»ah Certificate of Bank Indonesia (SWBI)2, which is still passive.
Along with the rapid grow of Islamic banking; Bank Indonesia replaced SWBI with better Islamic
monetary instruments in 2008, namely the Shariah Certificate of Bank Indonesia (SBIS), which
is based on Ju»alah contracts3.
Since 2005, the Bank of Indonesia as the monetary authority in Indonesia has implemented
full-fledged inflation targeting. This monetary policy framework is characterized with an official
announcement of inflation target for a specific timeframe. In addition, the monetary policy is
implemented independently to achieve high transparency and credibility. The inflation targeting
framework has been implemented by most central banks, particularly in developed countries in
the last seventeen years, hence the  interest rate pass through has attracted more attention
than before. The empirical application of the inflation targeting framework in some developed
and developing countries has been proven successfully in controlling inflation at a relatively low
level (See Figure 2), except for in Argentina and Indonesia.
Figure 2.
Inflation on Selected Countries with Inflation Targeting Framework
However, developed countries recorded a low economic growth of around 2-3%, while
Asean countries and Latin America could achieve higher economic growth of around 4-6%.
The countries with the most prominent economic growth are China followed by Argentina.
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2 Wadi»ah (deposit) is a kind of contract whereby a person leaves his valuable in the custody of others as a trust for safe keeping.
3 Ju»alah (reward for service) is a kind of contract of hiring for services, in which one party undertakes to pay a specified amount of
money for rendering a defined service in accordance with the terms negotiated between them.
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On the other hand, Indonesia»s economic growth remains quite stable between the ranges of
4-6%, including  during the global financial crisis (see Figure 3.)
The interest rate pass-through illustrates the degree and the speed of market adjustment
to the changes in interest rate policies set by the central bank. Interest rate pass-through is one
of the prerequisites for the transmission of monetary policies to work through interest rates.
Transmission channel through interest rate emphasizes the importance of price in the financial
markets, towards various economic activities in real sector.
Along with the development of Islamic banking, monetary policies affect not only
conventional banking but also affect Islamic banking since the transmission mechanism may
also pass through Islamic banking. Multiple monetary policy instruments are not limited to
interest rates only, but they also can use the profit sharing, margins or fees. Thus, in the dual
monetary system, the interest rate pass-through is more appropriately termed as the «policy
rate pass-through», where the policy rate in conventional bank is interest rates, and the policy
rate for Islamic banks is either profit sharing, margins, or fees.
The first aim of this paper is to identify the transmission channels of dual monetary
policies in Indonesia, both through conventional banks interest rates and the Islamic banks
profit sharing, margins, or fees. We also  identify the relationship between the two systems and
their effects towards inflation controlling. Second aim is to analyze how far the conventional
bank interest rates will follow the policy rate, and how far the Islamic bank will follow the
policy on profit sharing, margins or fees. We will analyze them both in short and in the long
run, and compare their transmission speed. Third is to formulate an effective dual monetary
policy, to increase the welfare and equalities of the society.
The second session of this paper will discuss the theoretical background and literatures,
while the third session will discuss the methodology and data. The fourth session will discuss
the results of the analysis, while conclusion will be presented on the last session.
Figure 3.
The Output Growth of Countries with Inflation Targeting Framework
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II.  THEORY
In the last 30 years, Islamic economics and finances have been gradually implemented in
various countries, alone or together with the conventional banking system. Along with the
larger size and the more significant of the Islamic economics and finances, the monetary policies
in Islamic perspective have also evolved.
In countries with multiple financial systems√ such as Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia √
the central bank should conduct monetary policies of both conventional and Islamic banking
systems, to effectively influence the overall macroeconomic condition.
Monetary policies rest on the relationship between interest rates in the economy (which
is the price of borrowing money) to the money supply to influence economic development
goals, such as control of prices (inflation and exchange rates), economic growth, and the
unemployment rate. This is possible because monetary authorities have the sole authority to
print and to circulate the official currency of the country.
There are various types of monetary policies, and all of them try to influence the primary
money (M0) by trading the debt or loan instruments of the government in open market
operations. The differences among these types of monetary policy are on the instruments
selected, and their target (see Table 1).
Table 1.
Types of Monetary Policy
Monetary Regime Instrument Target
Inflation Targeting Overnight rate Targeted inflation
Price Level Targeting Overnight rate Certain targeted inflation
Monetary Aggregates Growth of money supply Targeted inflation
Fixed Exchange Rate Spot exchange rate Targeted exchange rate
Gold Standard Spot gold price Low inflation measured with gold price
Mixed Policy Interest rate Unemployment and inflation rate
Source: Wikipedia
The application of a particular monetary regime evolves over time. Gold  standard regime,
which sets the exchange rate of a national currency against the value of gold, was widely
applied  throughout the world before 1971, but no longer used after the collapse of the Bretton
Woods Agreement in 1971. Price level targeting, which sets the rate of inflation each year and
corrects it in the next period so that the price level does not change in the long run, was once
applied in Sweden in the late 1930s. This regime was no longer implemented by any country
since 2004.
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The regime of monetary aggregates of the monetarist mainstream, which is based on
fixed money supply growth, was widely applied in various countries in the 1980s. In addition,
the fixed exchange rate regime, which is based on fixation of the national currency value on
foreign currencies, was applied by around 56 developing and small countries at different
grade.
There are also mixed policy, which is based on Taylor rule and believe the interest
rates will respond to the shocks of inflation and output. United States apply this since the
1980s.
The inflation targeting regime, which explicitly maintains certain level of inflation for
certain period (i.e. CPI inflation ), has been gaining popularity since the early 1990s and the
more widely adopted by the developed and developing countries nowadays.
Inflation targeting is a monetary policy regime, where the central bank tries to keep
inflation close to the announced target range, and is usually using the interest rate policy as the
instrument. According to Alam and  Masyhuri (2000), inflation targeting is primarily a framework
in monetary policies that seeks to eliminate the inflation bias of discretionary monetary policy,
in a transparent inflation targeting framework. Naturally, inflation targeting is a constrained
discretion in monetary policies.
This monetary regime is a ≈compromiseΔ between the classical mainstream, which argues
that inflation is always a monetary phenomenon, hence must follow strict rules; and the
Table 2.
Monetary Regime in Selected Countries
Countries Monetary Regime
United States Mixed Policy Indonesia Inflation Targeting
United Kingdom Inflation Targeting + secondary Malaysia Inflation Targeting
target on output & employment
Eurozone Inflation Targeting Thailand Inflation Targeting
Australia Inflation Targeting India Inflation Targeting
New Zealand Inflation Targeting
Canada Inflation Targeting
Singapore Exchange Rate Targeting
Source: Compiled from various sources.
Developed Countries
Countries Monetary Regime
Developing Countries
Brazil Inflation Targeting Korea Inflation Targeting
Chile Inflation Targeting Turkey Inflation Targeting
China Monetary Targeting  &
targeted currency basket
Hong Kong Currency Board – fixed
against USD
Latin America          Others
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Keynesians mainstream, which argues that inflation is not caused by the higher amount of
money than goods, but because of the number of worker seeking for job exceed the available
employment capacity. With this context, monetary policies are responsible to ensure the
equilibrium between demand and supply of the economy, hence must be conducted wisely
(discretion) in accordance with the current development. The compromise is, in the long run
the monetary policy follow the rules, whereas in the short run the monetary policies may have
discretion.
2.1.  Conventional Monetary Policy Transmission
From the conventional perspective, the monetary policy can be transmitted through interest
rate channel, credit line, exchange rate, asset prices, and expectations channel. The use of
interest rate instruments in inflation targeting, put the interest through pass-through as important
topic.
Models for interest rate pass-through have been developed for a long time. The model
developed by Rousseas (1985), marginal costing pricing model, argue that changes in bank
interest rates will be forwarded in the form of changes in interest rates to their customers
because it reflects the changes of bank»s marginal cost. This model is still considered as the best
model to explain the interest rate pass-through from policy rates to bank interest (Egert et al,
2006). The general representation of the model equation is:
(1)
Where  br is interest rates set by banks; γ0 is mark-up; and mr is the marginal cost price,
substituted with the market interest rate.
Several factors can explain the spread between the retail rate and the marginal cost of
funds, such as the level of competition (the higher the competition the lower the spread), the
difference in interest rates for different customers, and the asymmetric information between
borrowers and lenders. According to Bredin (2002), there are three categories of variable that
may affect the level and speed of pass-through from policy rates to bank interest rates; monetary
policies, the level of banking competition, and other factors.
On empirical ground, some studies use a standard single equation Error Correction
Model (ECM), for example Mojon (2000), Bredin (2001), de Bondt (2002), Espinosa-Vega
and Rebucci (2003), Chmielewski (2004), Tiemen (2004), Horvath et.al. (2005), Betancourt
et.al. (2008), and van Leuvensteijn et.al. (2008). The estimated equation proposed by de
Bondt (2002) is:
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where α  is pass-through parameter in one period, and β is speed of adjustment parameter for
pass-through effect. This estimation was conducted in two steps; hence two-step ECM method.
The first step calculates the residual from the first equation (br
n,t-1-γmrt-1). The second step estimates
the Equation 2 by including the residual value (br
n,t-1-γmrt-1).
The standard ECM was then developed to non-linear or asymmetric ECM, applied by
Scholnick (1999) and Chmielewski (2004), with the following modification on Equation 2:
(2)
(3)
where β1 is positive adjustment level at t and β2 is negative adjustment level at t.
Standard ECM are also developed in the form of extended ECM to detect the complete
or incomplete pass-through, as in Weth (2002) and Chmielewski (2004), with the following
modification on Equation 2:
(4)
For  δ  = 0 reflects an incomplete pass through.
Another version of the ECM is the auto regressive distributed lag (ARDL), proposed by
Crespo-Cuaresma et.al.(2004), Burgstaller (2005), Lie et.al. (2005), Egert et.al. (2006), and
Marotta (2007), with the following model:
(5)
where γ  is the speed of adjustment, and λ  is the long run multiplier (pass-through).
Another development of the standard ECM, such as Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares
models or DOLS, threshold autoregressive or TAR models (Horvath et.al., 2005), transfer function
approach model (Qayyum et.al., 2005), dynamic seemingly unrelated regression models or
DSUR (Sorensen and Werner, 2006), and the panel ARDL models (Aydin, 2007).
On empirical ground, Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (2003) compared Chile andother
countries (Euro, Canada, U.S., Australia and New Zealand), Egertet.al. (2006) used a sample
offive countriesin Central and EasternEurope, or CEE-5 (Czech Republic,Hungary, Poland,
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Slovakia, and Slovenia), while Sorensen and Werner (2006) used a sample of Euro area countries
with the dynamic data panel and ECM method.
Egert et.al.(2006) foundthat the interest rate pass-through effect in the CEE-5 was low
and decreased along years of observation, due to the absence of co-integration between the
policy rate and the bank interest rates (short and long run), and is expected to continue declining
in the future.
Sorensen and Werner (2006) found a large heterogeneity in the Euro countries
both on the long-run pass-through equilibrium and its speed of adjustment.These results
also confirm the slow and incomplete adjustment process of bank interest rate on
policyrate.
Horvath et.al. (2005) found corporate lending rates adjusted quickly and completely to
the changes of interest rate policy, while the deposit rates and household loans adjusted slowly
and incompletely. Qayyum et.al. (2005) found the pass-through of policy rate (T-Bills rate) to
the call money rate is complete in a month, while the pass-through from policy rates to deposit
rates and bank loans take longer. Liu et.al. (2005) concluded that there is a complete long run
pass-through for some  interest rates in New Zealand, and generally, confirmed that the policy
rates have greater influence on short-run interest rates and that an increase in transparency
increases the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Recent studies link the interest rate pass-through to the implementation of Euro (Marotta,
2007), to the macro-economic variables that also affect interest rates (Betancourt et.al., 2008),
to the optimal monetary policy (Kobayashi, 2008), and to the competition among banks (Van
Leuvensteijnet.al., 2008).
Marotta (2007) examined the structural breaks in the interest rate pass-through from
policy rates to bank lending rates and the process of unification of the Euro. The result shows
that the EU members have different speeds of adjustment to the Euro unification in the January
1999, and they adjusted to the new monetary regime slowly. He also found that the interest
rate pass-through in EU countries are incomplete, which means that the uniform monetary
policy is less effective. These results are contrary to the economic intuition that thed ecline in
the volatility of policy rate (money market rate) will faster the transmission from policy rate to
the bank»s interest rate.
Betancourt (2008) conducted a study on interest rate pass-through in Colombia from
micro banking perspective with monthly data during 1999-2006, using the single equation
error correction model (EC) and the vector autoregressive model (VAR). It is based on the
microeconomic theory that the effect of interest rate policy on banking is acomplex process
and also depends on the macroeconomic variables. The result of the two models supports
the hypo thesis that besides interest rate policy, macroeconomic variables also affect the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the banking interest rate. In addition, the EC
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model results indicate incomplete pass-through, where as the VAR model indicates complete
pass-through.
Kobayashi (2008) analyzed the incomplete interest-rate pass-through in Euro area
and the optima lmonetary policy. He stated that if not all commercial banks directly respond
to changes in interest rates policy, then monetary policy will provide different impact on
the economy. The results show that if only part of banking loan rate adjust for changes in
policy rate, then fluctuations in average lending rate raises the cost of welfare, then the
central bank needs to stabilize this fluctuation policy rates moothing. However, drastic
changes inpolicy rate are still required when there is a shock that directly affects interest
rates.
Van Leuvensteijnet.al.(2008) conducted a study on the impact of bank competition towards
the interest rate pass-through in the Euro area over the periods of 1994-2004 in two stages.
The first stage of the method was to  measure the level of competition using Boone indicator.
The second stage measured the effect of competition on interest rate pass-through using panel
error correction model (ECM) method. The first stage showed that higher competition increase
the spread between interest rate policy (market rate) and bank interest rates, particularly credit.
The second stage»s results showed that the higher the level of banking competition in a country,
the bank sets loan interest rates in accordance with the policy rate. In addition, the pressure of
competition is more severe in loans than in deposits. Bank interest rates in a more competitive
market respond stronger to changes in interest rate policy. The implication is the regulation to
increase banking competition will improve the effectiveness (strength and speed) of transmission
mechanism of monetary policy.
The results of interest rate pass-through with the standard ECM method for some countries
are presented in Table 3. Overall, the results of IRPT are not the same across countries. One
thing in common about the interest rate pass-through across countries is that the level of short-
run pass-through is lower than the level of long-run pass-through, except for the US, where
the level of short-run pass-through rate is equal to the long-run pass-through. The level of
pass-through effect between deposits and loans vary widely. In some countries, the pass-through
effect on deposit is lower than the loans, in some countries the opposite occurs, and in the
other countries, the pass-through effect on deposit is equal to the effect on loans. Thus, in this
case we can not draw general conclusion. Similarly, the speed of adjustment of the interest rate
pass-through is also varying across countries.
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Table 3.
Interest Rate Pass-Through using Standard ECM on selected Countries
Country
Bredin et al.
2001
De Bondt
2002
Espinosa-
Vega &
Rebucci 2003
Chmielewski
2004
Tieman 2004
Horvath et al.
2005
Note: S is deposit; P is loan; Pdk is short term; Pjg is long term. The highlighted cell represents complete pass-through  condition.
0.35-0.98
0.39-0.68
0.60-0.72
0.93-0.98
0.64-1.00
0.67-0.81
0.71-0.74
0.75-0.88
0.80  0.49
0.82  0.90
0.98  0.91
..…  -0.78
1.00  1.27
1.41  1.57
0.86  0.87
Author Short Term
Deposit Loan
Long Term
Deposit Loan
Adjustment Notes
Ireland
Euro area
Chile
Euro
Canada
US
Australia
New
Zealand
Polandia
Czech
Hungary
Polandia
Romania
Slovak
Slovenia
Hungary
0.32-0.35
0.20-0.68
0.27-0.57
1.05-1.13
0.84-1.00
0.40-0.87
0.34-0.42
0.22-0.57
0.09  -0.02
0.22  0.07
0.29  0.23
..…  -0.30
0.04  0.23
0.16  0.11
0.41  0.64
0.13-0.54
0.18-0.63
0.18-0.43
0.46-0.83
0.86
0.46
0.21
0.47-0.68
0.07  0.19
-0.15  0.01
0.18  0.10
-0.46 -044.
-0.02 0.07
0.16  0.15
0.05  0.67
Str Break
S≈P           S<P
Pdk < Pjg
S≈P           S<P
Pdk < Pjg
S>P           S>P
Pdk < Pjg
S>P           S>P
Pdk ≈ Pjg
S≈P           S<P
Pdk ≈ Pjg
S≈P           S<P
Pdk < Pjg
S>P           S≈P
Pdk < Pjg
S<P           S<P
Pdk < Pjg
S≈P           S≈P
Pdk < Pjg
S≠P           S≈P
Pdk < Pjg
S>P           S≈P
Pdk < Pjg
S≈P           S≈P
Pdk < Pjg
S>P           S≈P
Pdk < Pjg
S≈P           S≈P
Pdk < Pjg
S≈P           S≈P
Pdk < Pjg
0.64-0.88
0.92-1.53
0.55-0.88
0.57-0.82
0.24-1.01
1.00
1.09
0.77
0.85-1.02
0.76  0.65
1.10  0.67
0.85  0.96
0.80  0.73
1.62  0.79
2.08  1.85
0.81  0.98
0.25-0.72
S 3-15 month
P 3-10 month
S 1/2-4 month
P 2/3-2 month
S 1 1/2-17 month
P 3-11 month
S ≈0 month
P _-4 month
S 0-2 month
P 0.2 month
S _-1.4 month
P 3.86 month
S 2-2_ month
P 2 month
S 1-4 month
P 1_-5 month
S 1_  8.1 month
P 2.4  4.4 month
S 1.6  2.8 month
P 10_  9_ month
S 36.8  2 month
P 6.4  10 month
S  ..…   5_ month
P 3_  4 month
S 6.9  22_ month
P 9_  5.8 month
S 5_  6_ month
P 11.2  9_ month
S 3 – 2 month
P 4 – 2 month
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Table 4 gives the variation of the level of pass-through on deposit and loans across
countries. However, in general there isa certain pattern. In the short run, the pass-through
deposit is equal to or greater than the pass-through loans. In the long run, the pass-through
deposit is equal to or smaller than the pass-through loans. Most empirical studies show that
the level of pass-through deposit equal to the level of pass-through loans in the short and
long run.
Table 4.
 Interest Rate Pass-Through using Standard ECM on Selected Countries
Deposit  <  Loan Deposit  ≈  Loan Deposit  >  Loan
Chile (Pjg)
Euro area (Pjg)
US (Pjg)
Australia (Pjg)
Polandia (Pdk, Pjg)
Chile (Pdk)
Euro area (Pdk)
US (Pdk)
Australia (Pdk)
New Zealand (Pjg)
Czech (Pdk, Pjg)
Polandia (Pjg)
Romania (Pdk, Pjg)
Slovak (Pjg)
Hungary (Pdk, Pjg)
Slovenia (Pdk, Pjg)
Euro (Pdk, Pjg)
Canada (Pdk, Pjg)
New Zealand (Pdk)
Polandia (Pdk)
Slovak (Pdk)
2.2.  Islamic Monetary Transmission Policy
Transmission of monetary policye merged since the separation of the monetary authority
from fiscal authorities. Monetary authorities evolved  in line with the development of central
bank from circulation bank (issuing paper money or fiat money), which marked by the
establishment of Bank of England (BOE) in 1694 (Capie, 1994). Because of its inflationary
paper money (since it has no intrinsic value) then the task of central bank increased, including
setting the money supply to control the value of currency or inflation. This is not necessary
when the money has intrinsic value, like the gold Dinar and  silver Dirham during Islamic
caliphate. The last Khilafah Islamiyah, the Ottoman dynasty in Turkey, collapsed in 1924
(Islahi, 2004).
In conventional economic domination with its central bank and fiat money, Islamic
economics grow in Muslim-majority countries within the system of paper money and central
banks. Therefore, Islamic monetary system with its policies and transmission processes also
grew. A pioneer of the theory of contemporary Islamic monetary economics is Muhammad
Umer Chapra in his book ΔTowards a Just Monetary System (1985)Δ.
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The setting of contemporary Islamic financial institutions are not much different from
the setting of conventional financial institutions, hence the Islamic monetary policy instruments
are also similar with the instruments of the conventional one. Since both systems have similar
and also different instruments, the Islamic monetary policy transmission can be similar or different
from the conventional one. Chapra (1985) did not discuss specifically the issue of Islamic monetary
policy transmission. Further development of Islamic monetary theory also does not mention it;
including pass-through or its channels (see Siddiqui, 2007).
However, few empirical studies a rise to see the Islamic monetary policy transmission
characteristics. Sukmana and Kassim(2010) was an initial attempt to determine the transmission
of monetary policy through financing channel to economic growthin Malaysian Islamic banking
system, which is simply defined as follows:
(6)
Where IP is industrial production index, IF is Islamic financing, ID is third party fund collected
in Islamic bank, and ONIGHT is overnight interbank interest rate, representing the monetary
policy.
The same framework has been carried out by Ascarya (2010) for the case of Indonesia in
order to determine the transmission of monetary policy to the ultimate goal of monetary policy
(namely economic growt hand stability of the money), via financing channel in Islamic banking.
The model is simply defined as follows:
(7)
(8)
Where IPI  is industrial production index, CPI  is consumer price index, IFIN is Islamic bank
financing, IDEP is third party financing or funds in Islamic bank and PUAS is interest rate of
Islamic interbank money market.
In addition, Ayuniyyah, et.al.(2010) examined the multiple transmission of monetary policy
in Indonesia in order to grow the economic. The model is simply formulated as:
and
(9)
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(10)
(11)
Where ibr is funding or financing yield set by Islamic banks, γ0 is mark-upand imr is the marginal
cost price, substituted with market return.
For equation to estimate, we refer Bde Bondt (2002), with the following
modification:
where IPI is industrial production index, nIFIN is total Islamic bank financing, nCCRD is total
conventional bank credit, nIDEP is financing or funds from an Islamic third part, nCDEP is
total financing or funds from a conventional bank, iIDEP is Islamic banking deposits yield,
iCDEP  is conventional banking deposits yield, SBIS is the yields of Syariah Certificates of Bank
of Indonesia, and SBI is the yields of Certificates of Bank Indonesia.
The conventional interest rate pass-through model (Egerti, 2006) was modified to formulate
the Islamic pass-through rate policy model. Equation (1) is modified as follows:
Where α  is pass-through parameter for one period, and β is the speed of pass-through
adjustment.
The first step is to calculate the residual of Equation 10 (ibr
n,t-1-γimrt-1). The second step is
use the residual (ibr
n,t-1-γimrt-1), then estimate Equation 11.
III. METHODOLOGY
This paper uses quantitative approach to analyze monetary policy in a dual financial
system; conventional and Islamic. Empirical model that is built refers to the conceptual framework
as illustrated in Figure 4.
Dual monetary policy in Indonesia used multiple monetary policy instruments, namely
Certificate of Bank of Indonesia or SBI-based interest rates for conventional system, and Islamic
SBI or SBIS-based fee for Islamic banking, which are still referring to the SBI rate. SBI interest
rate and SBIS fee are policy rates.Policy rates will affect the funding and the bank financing
through the interbank money market both in conventional and Islamic banking, then will affect
the costof fund channeling. Expansion of credit and financing will finally affect the level of
output and inflation.
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Diagram 1.
Conceptual Framework
INFLATION
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SBI
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DISTRIBUTED
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P L S
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Money Market
Islamic Interbank
Money Market
3.1.  Data and Variables
The data used inthis study is monthly time series data during the period of January 2003
to September 2009, obtained from SEKI, DSM, and DPbS Bank Indonesia.
To answer the first research question, we use the following data:
1. SBIt : Conventional policy rate, a1-month SBI obtained from DSM-BI.
2. SBISt : Islamic policyrate, using the SWBI bonus and SBIS fee (since April 2008),
obtained from Statistics of Islamic Banking and DSM-BI.
3. PUABt : Conventional interbank money market rate, obtained from the DSM-BI.
4. PUASt : Islamic interbank money market, obtained from the DSM-BI.
5. INTt : Loan (working capital) interest of conventional banks, obtained from the
DSM-BI.
6. PLSt : The rate of profit and loss sharing for financing (Musharaka + Mudharabah)
in Islamic bank, obtained from the Directorate of Islamic Banking BI.
7. LOANt : Total value of conventional bank loan, obtained from the Indonesian Banking
Statistics BI.
8. FINCt : Total financing of Islamic banks, obtained from Islamic Banking Statistics BI.
9. IHKt : Inflation rate obtained from SEKI BI.
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Diagram 2.
Dual Monetary Transmission Channel (Conventional and Syariah)
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3.2.  Estimation Techniques
This study will use several estimation techniques, namely Granger Causality and Vector
Auto regression (VAR)/Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), Standard Error Correction Model
with two-steps, and descriptive analysis.
To answer the first research question (identify the dual monetary policy transmission
channel in Indonesia, both through the conventional and Islamic system, and also their link),
we use the Granger Causality technique. Causality relationships among the variables are based
on the following conceptual framework:
To answer the second research question, we canuse the Vector AutoRegression (VAR). In
the presence of cointegration, we will usethe Vector Error Correction Model (VECM).
VAR is a system of n equation, with n endogenous variables. Each endogenous variable is
explained by its own lag, current value of other endogenous variable, and the lag of other
endogenous variables. Therefore, in the context of modern econometrics, VAR is considered as
a multivariate time-series that treat all variable endogenously since there is nocertainty if the
variable is actually exogenous, and is fully rely on the data to explain. Sims (1980) argues that
if there is a true simultaneity among a number of variables, then the variables must be treated
equally and there should be no a priori distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables.
Enders (2004) formulated the simple first-order bivariate system as follows:
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Assuming that y
t 
 and z
t
  is stationary, εyt and εzt are white noise disturbances with standard
deviation σy and σz ;  while  εyt  and  εzt  are  white noise and uncorrelated disturbance. Meanwhile,
we can write the standard form of the primitive model above as follows.
(14)
(15)
eyt  and ezt  are the combination of εyt and εzt . The primitive form is called the structural VAR, and
the standard form is called VAR. Detail explanation on transforming the primitive to standard
forms is available in Enders(2004). The general VAR model can be presented as:
(16)
x
t 
 is the (n x 1) vector of endogenous variable; μ
t
 is  the vector of exogenous variable, including
intercept andtrend; Ai  is (n x n) coefficientmatrix ; and εt is the residual vector. In a simple
bivariate system of y
t 
and z
t 
, the variable  y
t
  is influenced by the present and past value of z
t
,
while z
t 
is influenced by the present and the past value of y
t 
.
To overcome the shortcoming of first-differenced VAR and to regain long-run relationships
between variables, we can use Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), as long as these variables
are co-integrated. Inserting the original equation in level into the new equations, we have :
(17)
(18)
a  is the long-runcoefficient, b is the short run coefficient,  λ is the error correction parameter,
and the term in parentheses indicate co-integration between variables y and z.
General VECM model scan be presented as follows (Achsani etal, 2005):
(19)
Π  and Γ  is the function ofAi . The matrixΩΠ can be decomposed into two matrices with
dimensions (n x r); ΩΠ = λβT ,  where λ is the adjustment matrix and β  is the co-integration
vector, whereas r  is the co-integration rank.
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Diagram 3.
Procedure of VAR Analysis
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The procedure of VAR analysis is presented Diagram 3. Once the basic data is ready, we
transform them into the natural logarithm (ln) to obtain consistent and valid results, except for
interest rates and profit sharing return. The first test is the unit root test, to determine if the
data is stationary or containing trend. If they are stationary at level, we use VAR directly. VAR
level can estimate long-run relation ships among variables. If data are not stationary at level,
we take the first difference and test if they are stationary. If the data in first difference is
stationary, we proceed to test for co-integration among variables. Without co-integration, we
can only apply the VAR at first difference, representing the short-run relationships among
variables. Without cointegration, the innovation accounting would not be meaningful for the
long-run relation ship among variables.
With the presence of co-integration, we can apply the VECM model on data level to
obtain the long-run relationships among variables. VECM can estimate the short and the long-
run relationships among variables. Within this condition, the innovation accounting for the
VAR level and VECM will be meaningful for long-run relationships.
Referring  the conceptual framework above, the second  issue in this paper will be analyzed
by using general VAR model, as in Equation 18. The two models of the dual monetary
transmission policy are output models and inflation model.
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We use impulse response function to analysis the response of endogenous variables on
other variables shock in the model. Decomposition variance analysis was also conducted to see
the relative contribution of variable in explaining the variability of certain variables. Data of IHK,
FINC, and LOAN are transformed into the natural logarithm (ln) to obtain valid and consistent
results.
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The  stationary test show only IPI, FINC, and PUAB are stationary at level, while the
remaining variables are stationary on the first difference. The second test is to determine the
optimal lag. The first step is determining maximum lag of stable VAR system, where the criterion
is stable if all root shave a modulus smaller than one and are located within circle unit (Lutkepohl,
1991). The results show the modulus range of 5 for model Output (IPI) and 6 for the inflation
model (CPI); both are located within the unit circle.
The second step is to determine the optimal lag; the shortest lag of Hannan-Quinnon
Criterion (HQ) or the Schwarz Information Criterion(SC). The results showed  the optimal of
one lag for both out put and inflation model.
We apply trace statistics for co-integration test to determine the number of cointegrating
equations that explain the long-run relationship. The results show that the Output model has
six cointegrated  equations, while the Inflation model has four cointegrated equations at critical
value of 5%.
4.1. Granger Causality
Granger Causality results for conventional  monetary policy transmission channel with
Output (IPI) as the final target, indicates acontinuity of interest rate channel, from SBI rate
to interbank rate (PUAB) and INT, from PUAB to INT and OUTPUT, from INT to the LOAN
and back to  the SBI and PUAB, and also from LOAN to OUTPUT, then from OUTPUT back
to LOAN. In general, the rise in SBI rate increases interest rates and lowers the LOAN and
OUTPUT.
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On conventional monetary policy transmission with Output (IPI) as final target, there is no
continuity of yield channel from SBIS margin to OUTPUT. SBIS can only affect the financial
markets  to PUAS. Meanwhile, the PLS affect FINANCING and  OUTPUT, and FINANCING affected
OUTPUT and  PUAS. In general, the SBIS yield only increased the PUAS yield., while the PLS
yield increase FINANCING and OUTPUT.
Diagram 4.
Conventional Monetary Transmission Channel: Output Model
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Money Market
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Diagram 5.
Islamic Monetary Policy Transmission Channel: Output Model
For inflation models, i.e. the monetary policy transmission channel with Inflation (CPI) as
the ultimate target, the Granger causality for the conventional system show a continuity of
289Transmission Channel and Effectiveness of Dual Monetary Policy In Indonesia
interest rate from SBI to PUAB and INT, from PUAB to INT, from INT to  LOAN and INFLATION
and back again to SBI and PUAB. After that, INFLATION affected SBI. In general the rise in SB
increases interest rate, lowers the LOAN and increase INFLATION.
Diagram 6.
Conventional Monetary Policy Transmission Channel: Inflation Model
Conv. Interbank
Money Market
INTEREST
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INFLATION
On the other hand, for the Islamic monetary policy transmission in Inflation model (CPI),
the Granger Causality indicated the discontinuity continuous from SBIS yield to inflation. SBIS
only affects the yield of PUAS Islamic financial market. Meanwhile, PLS affect FINANCING then
FINANCING affects PUAS. In contrast, PUAS, PLS and FINANCING were affected by INFLATION.
Diagram 7.
Islamic Monetary Policy Transmission Channel: Inflation Model
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In general, the increase of SBIS yield only increase the PUAS yield, while INFLATION lowered
the PLS and increase FINANCING.
From the Granger test results above, the conventional monetary policy transmission channel
is continuous to OUTPUT, especially loan, because conventional loans are parts of the real
sector activities. On the other hand,  in Islamic monetary policy transmission channel, the financial
sector (SBIS and PUAS) are separated from thereal sector (PLS and FINANCING), and only real
sector link to OUTPUT. Worth to note, in conventional side, the increase of SBI reduces the
output, since funds are absorbed into the financial sector rather than to the real sector.
In inflation models, the channel of conventional monetary policy transmission is continuous
to inflation, while Islamic channel is not. This is possible since the conventional interest-based
economy has two dichotomous markets (financial and real sector markets), where the financial
market is inflationary. On the other hand, the Islamic one is non-interest-based and focuses on
real sector, hence non-inflationary. Therefore, the interest rate (representing the price in the
conventional financial sector) affects inflation, while the SBIS (not representing the price in real
sector and financial sector) does not affect inflation. When the Islamic system still use SWBI
with wadiah akad, the SBIS represent the price in Islamic real sector, and when it use SBIS with
ju»alah akad, (profit sharing, which is comparable tothe one-month SBI), SBIS more represent
the price of conventional financial sector.
The conventional system affect the Islamic system mainly on loan,  since the monetary
and financial system in Indonesia is still dominated (97.4%) by conventional  systems, and the
real sector is related to credit, not the interest rates. On the other hand, Islamic sides affect the
conventional side more from the financing yields (PLS), since it is basically a real sector. Meanwhile,
conventional loan interest rates (INT) did not affect the Islamic side since INT is the price of
money in the financial sector, which is depends on many variables.
Generally, conventional monetary policy transmission is in line with the theory, while the
transmission channel of Islamic monetary policy cannot be clearly identified. However, Islamic
instruments using profit and loss sharing, such as mudharabah and musharakah in PLS financing,
positively affect the OUTPUT  and inflation .
4.2.  Impulse Response Function
The results of Impulse Response Function (IRF) for the dual monetary policy transmission
output models show that all conventional variables, namely credit (LOAN), interest (INT), interbank
money market (Interbank) and  the policy rate (SBI), permanently lower the output. On the
other hand, all the variables of the Islamic Policy Rate, namely financing (FINC),  profit sharing
(PLS), Islamic interbank money  market (PUAS) and Islamic Policy Rate (SBIS), have positive
impact in terms of increasing output permanently.
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The effect of the conventional variables shock towards the output decline and stable
after 16-21 periods, while the influence of the Islamic Policy Rate shock towards output decline
and stable more quickly after 11-16 periods. Interest rates on conventional systems  give the
largest negative impact on the output, while Islamic financing (FINC) has the largest positive
impact on the output.
For the inflation model (CPI), Impulse Response Function shows that except SBI rate, all
conventional variables  including the volumeof loan (LOAN), interest (INT), and the interbank
money market (PUAB), give inflationary impact on inflation permanently. On the other side, all
Islamic variables including financing (FINC), profit and loss sharing (PLS), Islamic interbank money
market (PUAB) and Islamic policy rate (SBIS), shows a positive impact in terms of reduce the
inflation permanently.
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The effect of conventional variables shock to  inflation decline and stable after 8-21
period, while the influence of Islamic variables shock on inflation decline slightly faster and
stable after 9-19 periods. Among conventional variables, the loan interest rate (INT) have the
largest negative impact (triggering) on inflation, while the Islamic profit and loss sharing (PLS)
have the largest positive impact (reduce) on inflation.
The same result applies for conventional loans (LOAN) and Islamic financing (FINC). Since
the credit is influenced by its interest rates, while the financing is affected by its profit sharing,
then the loan has a negative impact on inflation and output, while Islamic financing had a
positive impact on inflation and output. This pattern also applies for the conventional interbank
rate (PUAB) and Islamic interbank yield (PUAS). Since PUAB rate as the reference of conventional
banking interest rate give negative impact on inflation and output. On the other hand PUAS
positively affect to the inflation and output.
Furthermore, the Islamic monetary policy(SBIS) also showed similar behavior with other
Islamic variables; reducing inflation and encouraging the output.
Meanwhile, the effects of shock (increase) in SBI may affect (retain) inflation, but at the
same time, it also have a negative impact on output. SBI influence on inflation is the premise of
conventional economics to use the SBI as the main monetary instrument in controlling inflation.
However, it should be noted that the negative influence of the other three conventiona l variables
(PUAB, and LOAN INTEREST) is much larger than the positive effect of SBI on inflation.
The impact of interest rates and inflation are in accordance with the results of empirical
studies by Ascarya (2009a and 2009b), where the interest rate is one of the causes of inflation,
while profit sharing does not trigger the inflation. The impact of the interest rate and profit
sharing towards output was in accordance with Ryandono (2006) and Ascarya et.al. (2007),
where the interest rates gave negative impact to output or economic growth, while the profit
sharing gave a positive impact to output or economic growth. When the interest rate increased,
investment would decrease, so that the output would decrease as well. Meanwhile, when
the profit sharing increased, the investment would increase, so that the output would increase
as well.
4.3. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
For the model of dual monetary policy transmission channel with the final output (IPI) as
the target, the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) indicates that the conventional
variables with largest negative contribution (inhibitory) on output includes the interest rate
(18:13%), SBI(5:02% ), Interbank (4:57%) and LOAN(3:57%). On the other hand, the Islamic
variable sturned out to be apositive contributor on driving the output, though still small, like
the FINC (1.12%) and PLS (0.36%).
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For the dual monetary policy transmission with the ultimate goal of inflation (CPI models),
the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) shows that the conventional variables with
the largest negative contribution or triggering inflation, are interest (25.23%), credit volume
or LOAN (19:43%) and the Interbank Money Market (1.87%), except SBI which contribute
positively (inhibitors) on inflation by 1,52%. Meanwhile, Islamic variables are a positive
contributor in terms of an inhibitor of Inflation, although still small, such as PLS (4.63%) and
the FINC (1:31%).
Figure 6.
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Variance Decomposition of Inflation
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The results indicate that, overall, the conventional variables are inhibitors, while Islamic
variables are driving force for the economic growth . In aggregate, these conventional variables
contributed  negatively to economic growth by 31.29%, while the Islamic variables contributed
positively to economic growth by1.62%.
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Meanwhile, in order to achieve price stability or inflation, the conventional variables
generally trigger inflation, while the Islamic variables contain it, except for SBI (conventional),
which contribute 1.52%  in containing inflation. For inflation targeting, totally generally, the
contribution of conventional variables on triggering inflation is 46.53%, while the Islamic variables
contain inflation with contribution of 6.21%.
The above results generally show that the conventional variables ( mainly financial sector
variables ) naturally lead to inflation and restraint economic growth, while the variables of the
Islamic Policy Rate (mainly real sector variables), naturally do not trigger inflation, while
encouraging economic growth.
The behavior of SBI in restraining the inflation accord the conventional practice of
monetary policy, but fuels inflation through an increase in lending rates and hampering
economic growth.
V.  CONCLUSION
This empirical paper provides some important findings. First, based on the test Granger
Causality, overall, the flow of conventional monetary policy  transmission are in accordance
with the theory, while the Islamic monetary policy transmission cannot be clearly identified  and
is disconnected at PUAS. However, Islamic instruments that uses a contract of profit and loss
sharing, such as mudaraba and musharaka in PLS financing, positively affect the real sector»s
output and does not effect to inflation.
Second, based on the IRF result, the whole shocks from SBI, Interbank, interest rates and
credit (conventional) affect negatively and permanently the inflation and economic growth
(except SBI to inflation), and  indicates of speculative behavior. On the other hand, the shock of
SBIS, PUAS, Islamic profit sharing and  financing shows permanent and positive impact on
inflation and economic growth, without indication of speculative behavior.
Third, referring to the variance decomposition result, the overall conventional variables,
which are primarily financial sector variables, naturally play the role in triggering inflation and
slowing the growth. An exception is for SBI (conventional), which contribute 1.52% in keeping
inflation. The role of SBI in detaining inflation during monetary contraction are in accordance
with conventional practice of monetary policy over the years, but fueling inflation through an
increase in lending rates and lowered  economic growth. On the other hand, the Islamic variables
which are mainly real sector variables, naturally contributed to contain inflation and to stimulate
economic growth.
These three findings lead to the empirical conclusion that monetary policy to reduce
inflation with Islamic patterns is more effective than conventional patterns. These conclusions
provide some logical implications, (i) in the dual monetary system, an alternative approach to
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monetary policy, can be conducted using a quantitative approach that is not contrary to the
conventional  and Islamic Policy Rates. This is in line with the proposed strategy of Choudhury
(1997),  Ascarya, etal. (2007) and Ascarya and  Shakti (2008);  (ii) pricing approach can still be
used, but using Real Rate of Returnas a policy rate, so it can be applicable to conventional and
Islamic policies. It is also in line with Ryandono (2006), Ascarya, etal. (2007), Ascarya, etal.
(2008), Ascarya (2009), and Ascarya and Yumanita (2009), so that monetary policy is not only
to control inflation, but also to eradicate inflation; (iii) in line with points (i) and (ii), then SBIS
should use sharing profit contract (or musharakah mudharabah), rather than fee-based (ju»alah),
to give better effects on macroeconomic stability and inflation reduction.
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